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The rationality paradox centers on the observation that people are highly intelligent, yet
show evidence of errors and biases in their thinking when measured against normative
standards. Elqayam and Evans’ (2011) reject normative standards in the psychological study
of thinking, reasoning and deciding in favor of a ‘value-free’ descriptive approach to studying
high-level cognition. In reviewing Elqayam and Evans’ (2011) position, we defend an
alternative to descriptivism in the form of ‘soft normativism,’ which allows for normative
evaluations alongside the pursuit of descriptive research goals.We propose that normative
theories have considerable value provided that researchers: (1) are alert to the philosophical
quagmire of strong relativism; (2) are mindful of the biases that can arise from utilizing
normative benchmarks; and (3) engage in a focused analysis of the processing approach
adopted by individual reasoners. We address the controversial ‘is–ought’ inference in this
context and appeal to a ‘bridging solution’ to this contested inference that is based on
the concept of ‘informal reﬂective equilibrium.’ Furthermore, we draw on Elqayam and
Evans’ (2011) recognition of a role for normative benchmarks in research programs that
are devised to enhance reasoning performance and we argue that such Meliorist research
programs have a valuable reciprocal relationship with descriptivist accounts of reasoning.
In sum, we believe that descriptions of reasoning processes are fundamentally enriched by
evaluations of reasoning quality, and argue that if such standards are discarded altogether
then our explanations and descriptions of reasoning processes are severely undermined.
Keywords: rationality paradox, normativism, radical relativism, descriptivism, soft normativism, reflective
equilibrium, individual differences, reasoning
INTRODUCTION
The rationality paradox (e.g., Evans and Over, 1996) centers on
the observation that people are demonstrably highly intelligent,
yet simultaneously show evidence of numerous errors and biases
in their thinking, reasoning and deciding when measured against
normative standards associated with formal, logical systems or
probability theory. This rationality paradox has emerged from a
paradigm that sets descriptions of what human thinking‘is’ against
prescriptions of what human thinking‘ought’ to be. This paradigm
is based around what Elqayam and Evans (2011) describe as
‘prescriptive normativism,’ and can be traced back to pioneer-
ing research on systematic errors in reasoning by Wason (1966)
and Tversky and Kahneman (1974). The paradigm is also cen-
tral to the more recent program of individual differences research
by Stanovich and West (2000) and Stanovich et al. (2010) that
plays squarely into a Meliorist agenda, which views people’s rea-
soning as being amenable to improvement through training and
education. Elqayam and Evans (2011), however, have presented a
powerful critique of ‘normativism’ in reasoning research, whether
of the prescriptive variety favored by Meliorists or of the ‘empir-
ical’ variety, favored by Panglossian theorists (e.g., Oaksford and
Chater, 2007), who propose that human reasoning is a priori ratio-
nal, having been forged by adaptive evolutionary forces that have
patterned ﬁtness-relevant characteristics that enable effective goal
attainment.
Elqayam and Evans’ (2011) critique argues that both pre-
scriptive and empirical normativism invite researchers to make
a logically contested ‘is–ought’ inference. In the case of prescrip-
tive normativism, when there are competing normative accounts
then empirical ‘is’ evidence is inevitably called upon as a basis
for arbitration, giving rise to a clear case of is–ought reason-
ing. For example, Stanovich and West (2000) have proposed that
the reasoning of the most cognitively able respondents can arbi-
trate between opposing normative accounts (cf. Stich and Nisbett,
1980). In the case of empirical normativism, the is–ought inference
arises by virtue of the Panglossian view that ‘average’ or ‘modal’
responses that occur on reasoning tasks are an index of norma-
tive reasoning (e.g., Cohen, 1981; cf. Oaksford and Chater’s, 2007,
rational analysis approach). Elqayam and Evans (2011) contend
that normativism in both of these guises should be strictly avoided
given that the dubious is–ought inference that it invokes fosters
misunderstandings and obstructs sound theorizing. They instead
advocate a descriptivist analysis of reasoning as the only viable way
forward for the study of high-level cognition. Elqayam and Evans
(2011) further suggest that there is an acceptable role for ‘for-
mal systems’ in theory development when such formal systems are
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applied in a non-evaluative manner. In this respect they propose
that logical systemsorprobability theory canbeuseful in providing
a‘computational-level’analysis (Marr,1982) or a‘competence’ the-
ory (Chomsky, 1965) in terms of offering structural descriptions
of people’s abstract knowledge that are nevertheless ‘value-free.’ It
is also noteworthy that Elqayam and Evans (2011) propose that
normative approaches can be useful in one very restricted sense,
that is, when the researcher has an applied objective “to improve
thinking (rather than understand it)” (p. 242), since it is then nec-
essary to have criteria that can distinguish good thinking from bad
thinking.
In this paper we set out to defend an approach that can be
seen as a middle ground between a descriptivist perspective and
a stance that is based on prescriptive normativism. The approach
that we advocate has been dubbed ‘soft normativism’ by Evans and
Elqayam (2011), and is a position that sees a role for normative
evaluation in reasoning research alongside the pursuit of descrip-
tive research goals. Our argument (cf. Stupple and Ball, 2011)
proposes that normative theories have considerable value for for-
mulating and testing hypotheses, provided that researchers: (1)
remain alert to the philosophical quagmire of more radical forms
of relativism (e.g., Stich, 1990; Elqayam, 2012); (2) are mindful
of the biases and pitfalls that can arise from drawing on norma-
tive accounts of reasoning (see Elqayam and Evans, 2011); and
(3) ensure that they engage in a focused analysis of the processing
approach adopted by individual reasoners when confronted with
reasoning tasks (cf. Stanovich and West, 2000).
In this paper we will examine the position of soft normativism
in the context of dual-process theories of reasoning, individual
differences in reasoning and attempts to ameliorate reasoning
‘defects.’ Our conclusion is that descriptions of reasoning pro-
cesses are fundamentally enriched by evaluations about the quality
of that reasoning. As such, soft normativism is, we suggest, a rea-
sonable pragmatic position to take when both judging reasoning
and when formulating theoretical accounts. In developing our
argument we also address how soft normativism can circumvent
the contested is–ought inference by means of a well-recognized
bridging solution (see Evans and Elqayam, 2011) that is based
on the concept of reﬂective equilibrium (Goodman, 1965). We
extend the notion of reﬂective equilibrium to capture the way in
which the reasoning behavior of naïve individuals changes when
they are provided with extensive opportunities to practice their
reasoning.
We additionally propose that the distinction between the
applied science of ‘improving thinking’ versus the pure science of
‘understanding thinking’ it not a clear-cut dichotomy of the kind
that Evans and Elqayam might like to envisage. Because of this
overlap our own position sits at the intersection between Meliorist
and descriptivist research agendas. On the one hand we believe
that to inform efforts to enhance reasoning and argumentation
we must have a good understanding of underlying reasoning pro-
cesses, since this will aid our explanation of why some individuals
are better at making arguments or drawing inferences than others.
On the other hand, the converse relationship is also important,
since understanding the way in which Meliorist approaches are
effective in enhancing reasoning can supplement our theoretical
understanding of underlying reasoning processes. In other words,
studying the improvements that can arise in thinking, reasoning
or judgment through training or educational interventions allows
researchers to draw important comparisons between what peo-
ple can achieve as a result of such external guidance (coupled
with their own reﬂective process) and what people can achieve
through a spontaneous process. This contrast between a ‘sophisti-
cated’versus‘naïve’ reasoning process is psychologically interesting
and arises directly from Meliorist researchers’ attempts to align
reasoning with external, normative benchmarks.
STRONG NORMATIVISM AND RADICAL RELATIVISM
Extreme views at either end of the normativism–descriptivism
spectrum are beset with problems. A strong Panglossian norma-
tivist such as Cohen (1981) must be able to demonstrate that
all errors of reasoning can be explained away through lapses
of attention, misunderstandings of instructions or (ecologically
invalid) cognitive illusions. Stanovich and West (2000), however,
have convincingly demonstrated that if errors are predominantly
the result of lapses of attention then such errors within tasks
should be uncorrelated since these lapses will be randomly dis-
tributed, and likewise performance across tasks should also be
uncorrelated for the same reason. A wealth of evidence, how-
ever, has shown this not to be the case, with systematic errors and
biases being demonstrated within tasks and with clear correla-
tions arising between various reasoning and judgment tasks. The
correlations in performance across tasks are not without excep-
tions1, but donevertheless provide evidence that is problematic for
the view that the so-called ‘normative–descriptive gap’ (Stanovich
and West, 2000) can be explained within the framework of pure
normativism.
Moreover, Stich (1990) presents further challenges for adher-
ents of strong normative positions with his concept of ‘cognitive
pluralism’: that there is more than one good way to reason. Stich
illustrates this view with comparisons to alternative cultures that
may not share Western ideals about particular normative systems,
and he further extends this position (via Goldman, 1986) to ask
whether a normative system must hold in all possible worlds (or
at least ‘normal worlds’) if it is truly universal. If we concur with
Stich’s argument then we have stepped onto the slippery slope
to radical relativism and have accepted that there is no universal
benchmark to judge inferences (or to make judgments about judg-
ments) that can apply to all contexts. If we continue all the way
to the bottom of this slippery slope then we reach the anarchic
conclusion that all inferences and choices are equal. Buckwalter
and Stich (2011) note, however, that the concept of cognitive plu-
ralism made little headway initially, and they suggest that this
was because there was no compelling evidence that it is ‘psy-
chologically’ possible for people to have signiﬁcantly different
reasoning competences. They concur, however, that Stanovich’s
(1999) research program on individual differences in reasoning
goes a fair way toward demonstrating that there are indeed a
range of such competences. Although this does not indicate that
all possible inferences are justiﬁable, it nevertheless indicates that a
1It might be argued that those tasks that do not correlate with other tasks are exam-
ples of ones that give rise to ‘cognitive illusions,’ as described by Cohen (1981), or
else are tasks where speciﬁc ‘mindware’ (i.e., specialized cognitive rules or strategies;
see Stanovich, 2009) is more important than more general reasoning ability.
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degree of relativism may be undeniable when it comes to describ-
ing reasoning competence. The concept of cognitive pluralism
advanced by Stich not only poses problems for using normative
benchmarks as standards to judge thinking and reasoning, but
also has the potential to be challenging for computational-level or
competence-based descriptive accounts of thinking and reason-
ing by virtue of the need for an explanation of why such varied
competences arise.
We nonetheless defend a moderate relativism by noting that
the ‘slippery slope’ argument is a well-known fallacy such that we
can make progress by recognizing the limitations of accounts that
assume normative benchmarks and cognitive universality, while
also acknowledging some of the important issues that normative
views raise in defense of human rationality. Indeed, Samuels and
Stich (2004) have likewise argued for a ‘middle way’ when con-
ceiving of human rationality in the context of dual-process theory,
which they see as offering an escape from the rationality para-
dox. It is in a similar spirit that we argue for the application of
a softer normativism when engaging in reasoning research. The
soft normativism that we advocate is admittedly a few steps down
the slippery slope toward relativism in that it recognizes a role
for context and participant knowledge in judging the efﬁcacy or
appropriateness of an inference. Nevertheless, our proposed soft
normativism still places considerable value on people’s ability to
produce valid inferences in response to reasoning and decision
making tasks.
The crux of our position is that while we endorse the use of
normative standards as the basis for a descriptively oriented com-
putational level of analysis (or what might also be viewed as a
‘competence theory’ of reasoning; Elqayam and Evans, 2011), and
while we also acknowledge that from a descriptivist perspective
there is no additional value in regarding deviations from these
standards as ‘errors,’ we still believe that normative standards
can beneﬁt the applied study of reasoning provided that they are
deployed sensibly. We advocate the use of normative standards –
in accordance with Elqayam and Evans (2011) – where the goal
of research is to enhance reasoning, argumentation or judgment
so as to align it with external benchmarks of quality. Certainly a
primary goal of Meliorist researchers is to increase the propor-
tion of people who avoid bias and endorse some set of external
normative standards (i.e., is the desire is to ensure that people
reason as well as they are able to). This Meliorist agenda rep-
resents a substantial research program within the discipline of
Cognitive Science that is either followed explicitly (e.g., Stanovich,
2011) or else implicitly (e.g., Ball, 2013b). We contend that it
is simply not possible to have such a Meliorist agenda without
some notion of what constitutes ‘good’ thinking. We further assert
that while there can be a range of normative theories that apply
to a particular reasoning or decision making domain (i.e., we
accept that these standards can be controversial), they still offer
us a guide as to what constitutes good reasoning or judgment.
Thus, when a Meliorist researcher succeeds in enhancing think-
ing, this change in performance (or even the capacity to change)
needs to be compatible with a computational-level explanation
(i.e., the descriptivist researcher needs to be able to explain the
Meliorist researcher’s ﬁndings). In this latter respect we believe
that a soft normativist compromise is what is required to allow for
amutually beneﬁcial symbiosis betweenMeliorist anddescriptivist
agendas.
PITFALLS WHEN DRAWING ON NORMATIVE THEORIES
Theorists such as Cohen (1981) have argued that the reasoning
research paradigm has not been particularly charitable to partic-
ipants over the years, with a tendency to present ‘trick’ questions
with minimalist instructions to naïve individuals. Judging non-
normative responses as indicative of irrationality on this basis
is, he proposes, difﬁcult to justify. Evans (2007) has argued that
researchers such as Cohen who attempt to defend human ratio-
nality have tended to do so by appealing to three key problems
with the attribution of irrationality to reasoners: (1) the nor-
mative system problem; (2) the interpretation problem; and (3)
the external validity problem (see also Evans, 1993; Evans and
Over, 1996). The normative system problem is that researchers
are simply applying the wrong normative standards when judging
participants’ task performance, such that if the correct norma-
tive system were applied then behavior could be re-classiﬁed as
rational. It is worth noting that there are many logical systems
(e.g., see Garson, 2014) and that this diversity has provoked debate
about which normative system is the ‘correct’ one in any particu-
lar reasoning context. Such diversity can also prompt interesting
questions as to the characteristics of individuals who endorse dif-
fering benchmarks when multiple standards are available. For the
Meliorist, however, it is inevitable that there will be a degree of
‘satisﬁcing’ when selecting a normative standard against which to
judge reasoning or decision making, since such standards can be
debatable and can develop and change through cultural evolution
as tools of rationality. As Stanovich (2011) notes: “. . . there is
no idealized human ‘rational competence’ that has remained ﬁxed
throughout history” (p. 269).
The interpretation problem explains participants’ deviations
from normative theory not in terms of the application of faulty
reasoning processes but instead in terms of participants adopting
alternative mental representations of problem information to that
intended by researchers. The external validity problem, which is
closely allied with Cohen’s (1981) argument noted above, is that
the tasks that researchers select in order to demonstrate human
irrationality are not at all representative of the tasks that arise in
real-world contexts, which tend to be associated with normatively
accurate reasoning. Evans (2007) argues that the interpretation
problem and the external validity do not hold up to close scrutiny
because they fail to offer ‘complete’ accounts of the discrepancy
between normative benchmarks and actual behavior. We would
counter, however, that neither approach needs to offer a compre-
hensive account of normative–descriptive discrepancies so long
as each approach can offer up explanations of at least some of
the relevant data. Take, for example, the interpretation problem
as discussed by Evans (2007). There is a good degree of consen-
sus in the literature (e.g., Stanovich and West, 2000) that there
are individual differences in cognitive ability and thinking dis-
positions that inﬂuence reasoning. There is, moreover, evidence
of individual differences in the interpretation of elements of the
reasoning scenarios and vignettes that participants tackle in the
laboratory (e.g., Roberts et al., 2001; Stenning and Cox, 2006).
For example, if an individual fails to interpret the quantiﬁed
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assertion Some A are B as possibly meaning All A are B, then
this invites the assumption that Some A are not B is also true
(Newstead and Griggs, 1983)2. Newstead (1989) demonstrated
that quantiﬁer interpretation can indeed inﬂuence performance in
some circumstances, and Roberts et al. (2001) showed that while
there can be ‘errors’ based on interpretation, these vary according
to the complexity of the task. Stenning and Cox (2006) further
revealed that individual differences in the interpretation of quan-
tiﬁers result in differing patterns of responses. In sum, it seems
important to acknowledge that the interpretation problem is a
very real one, even if it does not provide a complete explanation
of deviations from normative benchmarks in all situations and
even if explaining the ﬁndings that arise in studies is not always
straightforward.
This interpretation problem in reasoning research also has
implications for explaining reasoning accuracy in the context of
dual-process theories that invoke a distinction between rapid,
effortless and intuitive ‘Type1’ processes and slow, effortful and
analytic ‘Type2’ processes (e.g., Evans and Stanovich, 2013).
The predominance of naive participants in reasoning studies
means that some task misinterpretation is inevitable, which con-
founds any inferences that researchers might want to make either
about non-normative responding reﬂecting Type1 processing or
about normative responding reﬂecting Type2 processing (see also
Thompson, 2011). In the latter case, for example, if quantiﬁers in
syllogistic reasoning tasks are misinterpreted then non-normative
responding might still be based on effortful Type2 thinking. In
this respect we are reminded of Smedslund’s (1990) critique of
Kahneman and Tversky’s (1972) heuristics and biases paradigm,
whereby he argued that we cannot decide if someone has rea-
soned logically unless we assume they represented the premises as
the experimenter intended, and likewise we cannot judge whether
someone represented the premises as intended unless we assume
they reasoned logically. This circularity continues to be an issue
when equating normative responses with Type2 processing (e.g.,
see Evans, 2012). For example, someone could employ a nor-
mative goal (i.e., to reason logically) and pursue this goal with
great effort using Type2 processing, and yet still offer a non-
normative response because they are unaware of the need for a
‘non-pragmatic’ interpretation of a quantiﬁer (i.e., an interpre-
tation that is inconsistent with everyday usage). In fact, Noveck
and Reboul (2008; see also Bott and Noveck, 2004) have shown
that effortful processing is required to narrow Some to Some
but not all, which means that in some cases a pragmatic inter-
pretation may require more Type2 processing than a normative
response.
Whilst these aforementioned issuesmight be seen toundermine
entirely any agenda that attempts to align participants’ responses
with normative theories, we would argue instead that such issues
simply alert researchers to the need for more cautious interpre-
tation of reasoning data. Indeed, we would go a step further
and propose that such issues can guide the careful design of
2This is an example of an issue of scalar implicature, as discussed by Grice (1975),
whereby there is a clash between the quality of the information provided and
then quantity of information provided. In a cooperative social exchange the use
of the quantiﬁer ‘Some’when it is possible to use the quantiﬁer ‘All’ violates Gricean
maxims of effective communication.
experiments in the ﬁrst place so that they can accommodate the
way in which participants are likely to engage in pragmatic inter-
pretations of information. An example of just such an approach
comes from a study by Schmidt and Thompson (2008), who used
the quantiﬁer At least one and possibly all instead of Some within
given premises and found that participants were facilitated in
giving normative responses. Whilst the deductive paradigm and
instantiations of it, such as the belief-bias paradigm3 (e.g., Evans
et al., 1983; Stupple and Ball, 2008), continue to be important
test-beds for dual-process accounts of reasoning, we advocate
the increased utilization of pragmatically interpretable quanti-
ﬁers (or else instructions regarding how quantiﬁers should be
interpreted) in order to increase precision when deciphering
apparent variations between normative benchmarks, descrip-
tions of performance and the alignment of outputs with Type2
processing.
THE IMPORTANCE OF DATA TRIANGULATION IN
EVALUATING THE NORMATIVE BASIS OF REASONING
Given that pragmatic interpretations and responses can explain
some (but not all) deviations from normative standards, we
believe that it is increasingly important to include the triangu-
lation of measures (e.g., response types, processing times, and
conﬁdence judgments) in any empirical studies that are exam-
ining the nature of reasoning, including its normative basis
and possible dual-process components. In this respect it has
been encouraging to see a burgeoning over the past decade
or so in the use of ‘multi-method’ approaches in reasoning
research (for good examples of such multi-method studies see
Quayle and Ball, 2000; Thompson et al., 2003, 2011a,b, 2013; De
Neys, 2006; Stupple and Ball, 2007, 2008; De Neys and Glu-
micic, 2008; Prowse Turner and Thompson, 2009; De Neys et al.,
2011; Stupple et al., 2011). Particularly valuable insights into the
nature and time-course of reasoning processes can be gained by
examining think-aloud protocols that are acquired from partic-
ipants who are tackling reasoning problems (e.g., Evans et al.,
1983; Lucas and Ball, 2005; Wilkinson et al., 2010) as well as
by analyzing neuroimaging data collected concurrent to reason-
ing performance (e.g., Goel and Dolan, 2003; Luo et al., 2013)4.
Houdé (2007) has, in fact, recently argued that “. . . one of
the crucial challenges for the cognitive and educational neu-
roscience of today is to discover the brain mechanisms that
enable shifting from reasoning errors to logical thinking” (p.
82). The challenge that Houdé refers to clearly requires a major
drive toward the increasing deployment of triangulating measures
that attempt to understand the neural underpinnings associated
with the transition that people are able to make toward nor-
mative responding through training and education. A recent
3Belief-bias is a pervasive tendency in reasoning to accept believable conclusions
more frequently than conclusions that contradict beliefs, irrespective of the logi-
cal validity of conclusions (see Evans et al., 1983, for pioneering research on this
phenomenon that also established the standard ‘belief-bias paradigm’ that inspired
most subsequent research).
4Another interesting methodology that is being used increasingly in the study of
reasoning concerns the measurement and analysis of autonomic arousal (e.g., De
Neys et al., 2010; Morsanyi andHandley, 2012), which appears to reveal participants’
implicit awareness of reasoning conﬂicts (e.g., between the logical status and belief
status of conclusions).
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example of such an approach comes from Luo et al. (2014)
who demonstrated differences in activation for the left inferior
frontal gyrus, left middle frontal gyrus, cerebellum, and pre-
cuneus for a group of highly belief-biased participants who had
subsequently received logic training and switched to logic-based
responding.
A further monitoring approach for examining the dynamic
aspects of reasoning that we are particularly enthusiastic about
is to deploy eye-tracking (e.g., Ball et al., 2003, 2006) to determine
the moment-by-moment attentional shifts in processing that arise
when participants attempt the visually presented problems that
are typically used in reasoning studies (see Ball, 2013a, for a recent
summary of key ﬁndings deriving from eye-tracking research in
reasoning). Eye-tracking studies have, we contend, provided some
of themost compelling evidence todate thatType2 analytic reason-
ing that is attuned to normative principles plays an important role
in determining whether heuristically cued cards are subsequently
selected or rejected in the Wason four-card selection task (see
Evans and Ball, 2010). Likewise, eye-tracking studies of belief-bias
effects (e.g., Ball et al., 2006) have been inﬂuential in revealing that
people spend longer reasoning about ‘conﬂict’ syllogisms, where
conclusion validity and believability are in competition (i.e., those
with invalid-believable conclusions and valid-unbelievable con-
clusions), relative to ‘non-conﬂict’ syllogisms, where conclusion
validity and believability concur (i.e., those with valid-believable
and invalid-unbelievable conclusions). The evidence that conﬂict
problems take longer to process than non-conﬂict problems is
viewed by Stupple and Ball (2008) as indicating that participants
are ‘sensitive’ to the fact that the logic of a conclusion and its
belief status are in opposition such that extra processing effort
has to be allocated to resolving the conﬂict. Such ﬁndings res-
onate with recent proposals that have been forwarded by De Neys
(2012), who suggests that people’s indirect sensitivity to the nor-
mative status of presented conﬂict conclusions is indicative of their
possession of an ‘intuitive logic’ (a Type1 process) that functions
implicitly and in parallel to implicit heuristics (also Type1 pro-
cesses) to signal the need for Type2 processing. De Neys (2014)
presents some clariﬁcations about the role of these controversial
‘gut-feelings’ in shaping the way participants respond to conﬂict
problems and asserts that whether or not we endorse his ‘log-
ical intuition’ proposal we can certainly question the idea that
Type1 responses can typically be attributed to a failure in conﬂict
detection. We are mindful, however, of the calls from Singmann
et al. (2014) for the application of the most rigorous, scientiﬁc
approach possible when examining such ‘extraordinary’ claims as
the existence of an intuitive logic (see also Klauer and Singmann,
2013).
One important area of eye-tracking research in the reasoning
domain that is currently gaining increased attention concerns the
analysis of eye-movement metrics that are directly linked to peo-
ple’s comprehension of visually presented logical statements. For
example Stewart et al. (2013) deployed eye-tracking to examine
how readers process “if . . . then” statements used to commu-
nicate conditional speech acts such as promises (which require
the speaker to have perceived control over the consequent event)
and tips (which do not require perceived control). Various eye-
tracking measures showed that conditional promises that violated
expectations regarding the presence of speaker control resulted
in processing disruption, whereas conditional tips were processed
equally easily regardless of whether speaker control was present
or absent. Stewart et al. (2013) concluded that readers make very
rapid use of pragmatic information related to perceived control
in order to represent conditional speech acts as they are read.
These kinds of on-line studies of ‘reasoning as we read’ (see also
Haigh et al., 2013) seem likely to open up many new possibilities
for advancing an understanding of reasoning processes by pro-
viding converging empirical evidence to help arbitrate between
competing theoretical accounts.
Overall, we contend that without alternative, convergent mea-
sures of reasoning that extend well beyond mere response choices
we have no direct gage of the nature and time-course of reason-
ing, such as whether the cognitive processing that participants
deploy is slow and effortful or fast and intuitive. Furthermore,
simply knowing that responses are consistent with normative
benchmarks is clearly insufﬁcient to claim that Type2 thinking
is involved (e.g., Evans and Stanovich, 2013; see also Evans, 2012,
for important arguments and evidence in this respect). A recent
illustration of this point comes from Stupple et al. (2011), who
demonstrated correlations between response times and norma-
tive responding in a belief-bias paradigm, with increased response
times to invalid-believable problems being indicative of increased
normatively aligned performance. Thus, those participants who
exhibited longer response timeswhere therewas a conﬂict between
belief and logic, and who identiﬁed invalid-believable conclusions
as ‘possibly true’ rather than ‘necessarily true’ (which requires a
more complex understanding of Some . . . are not . . . than the stan-
dard pragmatic interpretation), appeared to possess the requisite
cognitive resources and motivation to search for counterexamples.
This meant that these participants were more likely to respond
normatively to belief-oriented problems in general, and not just
to the invalid-believable conﬂict items.
Similarly, Stupple et al. (2013) investigated ‘matching bias’ in
syllogistic reasoning from a dual-process perspective. Matching
bias is the phenomena whereby responses are simply matched to
terms mentioned in a rule or are based on the surface features
of premises, in either case being based on a ‘non-logical’ pro-
cess (e.g., see Evans and Lynch, 1973; Wetherick and Gilhooly,
1995). In Stupple et al.’s (2013) study the surface features of
problems were manipulated so as to be either congruent with
or orthogonal to the logic of the presented conclusions. Perfor-
mance was then judged based on whether it aligned with the
surface features of the problems or with normative responses
as determined by formal logic. This experimental set-up is
much like the belief-bias paradigm, where conclusion believ-
ability and validity either concur or conﬂict. To manipulate the
surface features of problems Stupple et al. (2013) used premises
and conclusions that were matched or mismatched in terms of
the presence of double negated quantiﬁers (e.g., No A are not
C) or in terms of the presence of standard afﬁrmative quan-
tiﬁers (e.g., All A are C). Using this paradigm Stupple et al.
(2013) revealed some important parallels between their results
and ﬁndings deriving from studies of belief-bias. One key par-
allel concerned the observation that ‘conﬂict’ problems in both
paradigms show inﬂated response times relative to non-conﬂict
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problems (cf. Thompson et al., 2003; Ball et al., 2006; Stupple and
Ball, 2008; Stupple et al., 2011), which is entirely in line with
dual-process predictions and attests to the value of obtaining
response-time data as a way to inform theorizing. Stupple et al.’s
(2013) study also revealed that the supposedly ‘intuitively obvious’
deduction of double negation elimination (see Rips, 1994, pp. 112–
113) was demonstrably unintuitive for a number of participants,
who showed increased response times to problems involving such
negations.
Perhaps of more pertinence to the present discussion are
Stupple et al.’s (2013) ﬁndings from the same study that con-
trasted with what has previously been observed for problems
within the standard belief-bias paradigm, particularly in relation
to correlations between response times and normative response
rates. In particular, valid non-matching ‘conﬂict’ problems actu-
ally revealed an association between normative responding and
faster responses, which is distinct from what is seen in belief-bias
research, where valid-unbelievable conﬂict items show an associ-
ation between normative responding and slower responses (e.g.,
Stupple et al., 2011). To explain this discrepancy Stupple et al.
(2013) proposed that motivated participants who do not pos-
sess the double elimination rule (or who have difﬁculty applying
it) might engage in a misdirected and slow analytic process to
ﬁnd a matching-consistent answer (see Stupple and Waterhouse,
2009; Stupple et al., 2013), whereas participants who eliminate the
double negation are confronted with little cognitive demand in
identifying that the conclusion is necessarily true such that they
can rapidly respond normatively. We suggest that without the
reference point that normative benchmarks offer, such idiosyn-
crasies in individual responding may well pass unnoticed. The
combination of cognitive effort, quantiﬁer interpretation and
cognitive disposition demonstrate the increasing importance of
individual differences approaches in reasoning research and also
illustrate the utility of having normative benchmarks as a point of
comparison.
In the next section we discuss in more detail the value of adopt-
ing an individual differences perspective on reasoning strategies
whilst also further examining the way in which normative refer-
ence points can beneﬁt an understanding of reasoning data. First,
however, we take a brief detour into another area of contem-
porary reasoning research that also exempliﬁes the importance
of methodological triangulation, that is, research on metacogni-
tion and reasoning – or so-called ‘meta-reasoning’ (for a recent
review see Ackerman and Thompson, 2014; for pioneering con-
ceptual work see Thompson, 2009). This growing research topic
is concerned with the processes that ‘regulate’ reasoning, for
example, by setting goals, deciding among strategies, monitor-
ing progress and terminating processing. The meta-reasoning
framework is predicated on the assumption that people are gen-
erally motivated to attempt to provide ‘right’ answers to reasoning
problems. Indeed, meta-reasoning is centrally concerned with an
individual engaging in processes such as determining how much
effort to apply to the problem, assessing whether a solution that
they have generated is correct, and deciding whether to initi-
ate further processing if a putative solution seems in some way
inadequate (Thompson, 2009; Ackerman and Thompson, 2014).
As a case in point, Ackerman and Thompson (2014) suggest that
the very ﬁrst decision that that a reasoner should make is that
of whether to attempt a solution at all, since the individual
might determine that the amount of effort they need to apply
to achieve a solution is greater than the perceived beneﬁt of
solving the problem (cf. Kruglanski et al., 2012). Ackerman and
Thompson (2014) suggest that such ‘Judgments of Solvability’
are likely to be based on a range of factors, including beliefs
about the task at hand, prior experience of solving similar prob-
lems, as well as surface-level cues within the problem itself that
might signal difﬁculty, such as the ease with which the prob-
lem can be mentally represented (e.g., Quayle and Ball, 2000;
Stupple et al., 2013) or the perceived coherence amongst prob-
lem elements (e.g., Topolinski and Reber, 2010; Topolinski,
2014).
As can be seen in relation to Judgments of Solvability, the meta-
reasoning framework presupposes that people do not have direct
access to their underlying reasoning processes, but instead base
their monitoring and regulation judgments on their experience
with similar problems as well as on available cues associated with
the problem being tackled. One particularly important cue is that
of ‘ﬂuency,’ which is the ease or speed with which a solution to a
reasoning problem comes to mind (e.g., Alter and Oppenheimer,
2009; Ackerman and Zalmanov, 2012). Thus, an individual will
generally view an initial response that is produced ﬂuently as
being accurate, whereas an initial response that is difﬁcult to
generate will give rise to a sense of unease in relation to its accu-
racy, often triggering further processing effort. Importantly, such
heuristic cues to accuracymay not be valid predictors of normative
correctness, leading to some striking dissociations between partic-
ipants’ response conﬁdence and normative standards of accuracy
(e.g., see Shynkaruk and Thompson, 2006; Prowse Turner and
Thompson, 2009; De Neys et al., 2013). Thompson (2009) and
Thompson et al. (2011b, 2013) have gone beyond the basic con-
cept of answer ﬂuency in their theorizing to suggest that such
ﬂuency mediates a judgment that they term ‘Feeling of Rightness.’
It is this Feeling of Rightness judgment that then acts as a metacog-
nitive trigger, either: (1) terminating processing in cases where a
Type1 process has readily produced a rapid, intuitive answer that
is attributed to be correct; or (2) switching from Type1 to Type2
processing in cases where the initial, intuitive answer is associ-
ated with a low Feeling of Rightness and is therefore attributed
to be potentially incorrect (see Ackerman, 2014, for further evi-
dence and model development regarding people’s time investment
in reasoning).
In sum, recent evidence gives clear grounds for viewing meta-
reasoning judgments as playing a crucial role in monitoring and
regulating on-going reasoning, such that intermediate conﬁdence
or ‘rightness’ assessments determine the amount of subsequent
effort that reasoners invest in a task (Ackerman, 2014). The
methodology underpinning this meta-reasoning research is based
on a rich triangulation of measures, including various forms of
conﬁdence judgments as well as processing times and normative
response accuracy. Analyzing conﬁdence ratings in conjunction
with other measures also seems advantageous in terms of distin-
guishing between normatively incorrect answers that participants
‘expect’ to be correct with high probability and wild guesses (i.e.,
responses made with particularly low conﬁdence), which perhaps
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reﬂect task abandonment and may therefore be of less theoretical
interest.
We suggest that the evident tendency in meta-reasoning
research to evaluate participants’ responses against normative
benchmarks such as logic, suggests that this emerging research
tradition has a strong normative orientation, which is also bol-
stered by the inherent assumption underpinning the approach
that participants are generally striving to produce ‘right’ answers
to problems. Notwithstanding our view that normative consid-
erations have an important role to play in emerging research
on meta-reasoning, we do nevertheless concur with Thompson’s
(2011) argument that simply knowing that a ﬁnal outcome is
normative tells us virtually nothing about underlying mecha-
nisms. At the same time, however, we believe that a combination
of process-oriented analyses together with the normative assess-
ment of outcomes provides for a maximally rich and meaningful
approach to reasoning research, especially when combined with
studies of the roles of learning, practice and feedback in reason-
ing, as discussed below. These themes tap directly into a Meliorist
research agenda, where evaluations of normative correctness are
crucial. In this respect we look forward to further research using
measures such as Judgment of Solvability and Feeling of Right-
ness in the context of training reasoning through instructions,
practice, and feedback. We believe that such work could inspire
new insights into the monitoring and regulatory processes that
lead to both normative and non-normative reasoning responses,
whilst also beneﬁting applied research on improving reasoning
(see Ackerman and Thompson, 2014, for discussion of numer-
ous real-world domains that could be enhanced through such
research, such as innovative product design and ﬁnancial decision
making).
THE IMPORTANCE OF FOCUSING ON INDIVIDUAL
DIFFERENCES
Since the seminal researchof Gilhooly et al. (1993),Roberts (1993),
and Ford (1995) there has been a snowballing of individual dif-
ferences studies in reasoning research, perhaps best exempliﬁed
by the work of Stanovich and colleagues (e.g., Stanovich and
West, 2000). The question of why some participants respond in
accordance with normative standards more frequently than oth-
ers forms an important research agenda in its own right, but
the ability to account for individual differences within a par-
ticular theoretical framework is increasingly part of the debate
in a range of reasoning research paradigms (e.g., Stupple et al.,
2011; Trippas et al., 2013). Nickerson (2008) argues that deter-
mining which normative system is the best one in a given
context is often an uninteresting issue, unless it also happens
that aligning cognitive processing with the normative system in
question also correlates with something that people care about.
A strong supporter of a normativist agenda could argue that
since Stanovich and colleagues have demonstrated correlations
between tasks from the reasoning and decision making litera-
ture with things that are prized – such as SAT scores – then it
is possible to believe that there is something valuable in adher-
ing to these normative standards. If our instrumental goals are
to gain a place at a prestigious university or to score well on an
employer’s recruitment test of cognitive ability, then reasoning
and deciding in accordance with normative benchmarks can be
an instrumental goal, at least for some participants some of the
time5.
There is, nevertheless, much debate concerning the issue of
how normative standards can be derived in the ﬁrst place. The
concept of ‘reﬂective equilibrium’ is central to this debate, and
was a notion that was advanced by Goodman (1965), who argued
that as the rules of deduction are determined by accepted deduc-
tive practice then good deductive rules are retained and poor
deductive rules that lead to poor inferences are dropped. This
is a rigorous circular process that is engaged in by philosophers
and logicians in developing normative standards of inference.
This concept was further developed by Cohen (1981) in the con-
text of the rationality paradox. The idea is that normative theory
and descriptive evidence can justify each other by being brought
into coherence such that there is an alignment between norms
and behaviors. As Elqayam and Evans (2011) note, reﬂective
equilibrium is a‘bridging solution’ to the notorious is–ought prob-
lem since it presupposes that full coherence is entirely possible
between norms and behavior inasmuch as they become mutually
justiﬁcatory.
Of course, the proposal that reﬂective equilibrium can offer a
route to deriving appropriate normative benchmarks is not with-
out its critics, with Stich (1990), for example, emphasizing that
it has the potential once again to lead down the slippery slope
to radical relativism. Stich argues that the gambler’s fallacy and
base rate neglect pass many people’s tests of reﬂective equilibrium,
which indicates that the principle can be ﬂawed as a means of jus-
tifying inferences. Stich also demonstrates that the issue cannot
be solved if we impose restrictions on the people whose reﬂec-
tive equilibrium is considered to be sufﬁciently rigorous to serve
as a justiﬁcation, since even experts could “end up endorsing a
nutty set of rules” (p. 86). There may also be cultural and inter-
personal differences in assessing the justiﬁcation of an inference
that yield different benchmarks in different contexts. For many,
Stich’s critique would appear terminal for the use of reﬂective
equilibrium as a means of justifying universal norms for infer-
ence. Nevertheless, his critique does not entirely rule out the
application of similar principles by individuals in justifying their
own inferences and judgments. Indeed, it is possible that partic-
ipants can engage in an informal process analogous to reﬂective
equilibrium in establishing how they should respond to reasoning
tasks.
Recent ﬁndings by Ball (2013b) advance this aforementioned
concept of ‘informal reﬂective equilibrium’ by indicating that par-
ticipants will, through repeated reasoning practice, develop their
own benchmarks for accuracy. This observation seems further
to support a moderate relativism that functions hand-in-glove
5The concept of ‘instrumental goals’ relates to Evans and Over’s (1996) notion
of Rationality1, that is, ‘instrumental’ or ‘pragmatic’ rationality, deﬁned in terms of
thinking or deciding in away that is generally reliable and efﬁcient for achieving one’s
personal goals. As such, Rationality1 extends to genetically hard-wired procedures
and experientially acquired processes that are automatic and implicit in nature.
Evans and Over (1996) contrast the concept of Rationality1 with Rationality2, with
this latter type of rationality being deﬁned in terms of acting when one has a reason
for what one does that is sanctioned by a normative theory. This means that the
individual is not merely complying with normative rules in an implicit manner, but
is following such rules explicitly.
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with soft normativism. Ball (2013b), for example, demon-
strated that participants who repeatedly engaged in reasoning with
belief-oriented syllogisms that are known to be susceptible to a
non-logical belief-bias became steadily more normatively justiﬁed
in their responding over time. This trend toward increased nor-
mative responding was seen to arise even more quickly amongst
those receiving feedback regarding the logical appropriateness of
their decisions. Ball’s ﬁndings suggests that through mere engage-
ment and increasing familiarity with reasoning tasks people can
self-determine a strategy that can affect a logical solution. Such
evidence suggests a novel perspective on reﬂective equilibrium
that is not based so much on what the most cognitively able do or
what the majority do, but which instead is based on what individ-
uals do when provided with opportunities for practice. This type
of informal or ‘naïve’ reﬂective equilibrium admittedly lacks the
rigor of the approach advanced by Goodman (1965), but it never-
theless indicates that untrained participants can align themselves
with normative benchmarks without explicitly knowing that they
are doing so or receiving feedback indicating that this is the case.
Not all participants succeed in such normative alignment, and it
could be argued that there is an element of ‘satisﬁcing’ entailed
in this process (e.g., see Evans, 2006, 2007), whereby individual
differences in cognitive ability, disposition and motivation may all
play an important role.
The present claims regarding the concept of informal reﬂective
equilibrium – as well as Ball’s (2013b) empirical evidence – seem
to chime with the radical idea mentioned earlier that people may
have ‘logical intuitions,’ as demonstrated, for example, by their
decreased conﬁdence when rejecting normative responses and
endorsing non-normative responses (e.g., De Neys, 2012, 2014;
De Neys and Bonnefon, 2013; see also Stupple et al., 2013). In
Ball’s (2013b) study the steadily increasing normative respond-
ing that was observed over time by the participants who did not
receive feedback might well have been shaped by a repeated sense
of metacognitive dissatisfaction with proffered answers – arising
from ‘logical intuitions’ – in cases where such answers contra-
dicted normative benchmarks. An alternative view is that through
repeated exposure to belief-biased problems, the Type2 analytic
process becomes better attuned to the problem structure and
participants become increasingly aware of the role of counterex-
ample models in invalidating presented conclusions, irrespective
of their belief status. Such issues warrant further investigation, but
a purely descriptivist approach to reasoning research would rule
out the use of logic as a normative reference point when scrutiniz-
ing participants’ responses and would, moreover, seem to render
these avenues of investigation out of bounds, irrespective of their
scientiﬁc merit.
If we disallow normative theories from being utilized to
inform the development of research paradigms we believe that
we are, in fact, introducing a new benchmark for conducting
reasoning research that is potentially obstructive to progress.
For example, if the use of counterexamples is useful for good
argumentation (e.g., Weston, 2009) then it is not only impor-
tant to encourage our students to consider counterexamples to
improve their arguments, but also for us as cognitive psychol-
ogists to understand the processes whereby individuals become
attuned to the need to consider counterexamples in order to
reason better. More generally, by understanding the underlying
cognitive processes, we can better inform methods for improv-
ing thinking, but this would be hampered if we were not
able to make value judgments about the way that participants
approach their task. As another example we again refer to the
belief-bias study by Stupple et al. (2011) that we outlined previ-
ously, which demonstrated that the most normatively consistent
reasoners with belief-oriented syllogisms were those who had
inﬂated response times for a particular item type that required
the consideration of counterintuitive counterexamples. Stupple
et al.’s (2011) evidence reconciled the descriptivist ‘selective pro-
cessing theory’ of Evans (2000) with a previously conﬂicting
data-set arising from a study by Stupple and Ball (2008). In
addition, Stupple et al.’s (2011) evidence was informative from
a Meliorist perspective, since it highlighted elements of reason-
ing tasks that are particularly demanding whilst also revealing
individual differences in processing that correlate with solution
success.
When participants engage in reasoning experiments they are
likely to assume there are ‘right’ answers to the tasks (see the
discussion above on meta-reasoning), and without giving them
explicit guidance about normative standards we leave them to
attain their own reﬂective equilibrium. Experimenters generally
instruct participants what they should do when engaging in the
task. For example, Cherubini et al. (1998) instructed participants
by noting that: “Conclusions should follow from the statements
only, and should be certain direct consequences of them . . .
You should therefore try to ignore any knowledge of what the
premises are about and try to reason as if they were true” (p.
186). If experimenters direct participants to engage with a task
in particular ways then there is often an explicit ‘ought’ as to
the answers they are asked to provide. Moreover, it is gener-
ally indicated that there are correct solutions, as can be seen in
the following instructions from a study by Morley et al. (2004):
“This experiment is designed to ﬁnd out how people solve logi-
cal problems . . . Please take your time and be sure that you have
the logically correct answer before deciding” (p. 8, italics added
for emphasis). Even the most recent reasoning papers continue to
use phrases such as, “If you judge that the conclusion necessarily
follows from the premises, you should answer ‘Valid,’ otherwise
you should answer ‘Invalid’ . . .” (Trippas et al., 2014, p. 11). We
suggest that without instructing participants that there is a correct
or valid answer to a given problem it is unlikely that standard
effects from the reasoning literature would arise. More gener-
ally, we contend that it is actually very difﬁcult to envision a way
in which to present ‘value-free’ instructions in any meaningful
sense.
When presented with reasoning instructions – whether these
involve explicit directives or implicit hints that there is a ‘correct’
solution – participants may not generate answers that conform
to intended normative benchmarks, but instead may provide per-
sonally justiﬁable responses, based upon their understandings of
the task. Some participants take longer than others over the given
tasks, suggesting they have set more stringent personal thresh-
olds of reasoning adequacy. Others may ﬁnd that their intuitive
responses are satisfactory (e.g., to dismiss what is unbelievable
or to endorse what is intuitive). Indeed, for some there appears
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to be little reasoning analysis taking place at all, as arises with
the fastest responders who often seem to lack any disposition to
engage in reﬂective, analytic, Type2 thinking when confronted
with reasoning tasks. In examining such individual variation we
again argue that the best way to inform and enrich theoretical
proposals is by triangulating a multiplicity of measures (e.g.,
response times, conﬁdence judgments, and thinking dispositions)
in a way that is informed by normative benchmarks (see above; cf.
Ball, 2013a). Such an approach canbehighly informative, provided
researchers are cautious regarding disputes over such benchmarks
and the dangers of directly equating normative responses with
the deployment of analytic processes. The question of arbitrat-
ing between competing benchmarks is also considered by Crupi
and Girotto (2014), who argue that this lies in the realm of phi-
losophy rather than psychology and that the issue of arbitrating
between competing normative standards has not played a par-
ticularly signiﬁcant role in the reasoning literature. We have some
sympathy with this observation, but would add that it nevertheless
remains interesting and important to investigate the psychological
basis for why different reasoners align with different norma-
tive standards, as in the case of Wason’s (1966) selection task,
where some participants appear to reason according to Oaksford
and Chater’s (1994) ‘information gain’ benchmark whilst others
appear to reason according to the benchmark of propositional
calculus.
On the individual differences theme we also note that since
the most academically gifted tend to be those who are more cog-
nitively able, more motivated to ﬁnd the ‘right’ answer, and less
inconvenienced by the need to engage effortful, reﬂective pro-
cessing, then it is likely that their responses will correspond with
those predicted by normative theories. This is particularly likely
to be the case when those responses require additional cogni-
tive effort and motivation, such as occasions where Type1 and
Type2 processes come into conﬂict and the reasoner concords
with a Type2 response. The fact that the answers of these rea-
soners correspond with those of gifted professors of logic and
probability who construct normative theories in the ﬁrst place is,
perhaps, unsurprising. Where such evidence converges, we sug-
gest that it is warranted to make claims about whether answers
arose through intuitive or analytic thinking, especially if such
answers are associated with increased response times. Results
of this kind are not always so neat, but we suggest they do
warrant theory development and the generation of hypotheses.
Moreover, they are also given valuable context by the existence
of normative theories. Indeed, in a case where an individual
respondswith a logically necessary conclusion to amultiple-model
syllogism6, which is produced after an extended period of delib-
eration, through the consideration of alternative representations
and the application of considerable cognitive effort, it would seem
unreasonable to judge it as being of equal value to a response pro-
duced intuitively, and rapidly that may have involved very little
reasoning. From a Meliorist perspective, it is clear that this effort-
ful consideration of multiple models is more desirable than an
6A multiple-model syllogism is a cognitively demanding reasoning problem where
multiple possibilities need to be considered to be certain of what necessarily follows
according to formal logic (e.g., see Johnson-Laird and Byrne, 1991).
intuitive, non-logical response and such results provide both an
interesting context for normative theories and evidence of further
sub-sets of behavior that a descriptivist must account for in their
theorizing.
We contend that it is psychologically interesting to investigate
reasoners who understand and engage with the experimenter’s
instructions, reasoners who adopt more nuanced interpretations
of quantiﬁers, and reasoners who actively consider alternative
representations and counterexamples – particularly those who do
this without formal instruction in the relevant normative theory.
We would argue that an abandonment of the research program
into the psychological correlates of normative reasoning would
be a far more damaging than the potential for theoretical cul-de-
sacs that can be generated when philosophical and psychological
questions are conﬂated.
NORMATIVISM AS A SUB-CATEGORY OF INSTRUMENTAL
RATIONALITY
An appeal to soft normativism seems to be reﬂected in Elqayam’s
(2012) more recent development of a metatheoretical framework
that she describes as grounded rationality, which involves an exten-
sion of her earlier purely descriptivist position (e.g., Elqayam
and Evans, 2011). Elqayam’s (2012) grounded rationality pro-
posal involves her acceptance of a ‘moderate epistemic relativism,’
that is, the view that any description of behavior or cognition as
rational needs to be grounded by the context in which it takes
place. Thus, for example, a slow analytic judgment will always
be irrational if it is made too late to be relevant. We agree with
Elqayam’s (2012) position regarding moderate epistemic rela-
tivism, but we take issue with a key aspect of her grounded
rationality account, which only allows for a very narrow role for
normativism in judging behavior or cognition. The argument
is that in order for an inference to be considered as normative
the reasoner must adopt the goal of reasoning in accordance
with a particular normative theory, with the adoption of such
a goal presumably being a conscious process. In this way “nor-
mative rationality can still be evaluated, albeit as a sub-category
of instrumental rationality” (Elqayam, 2012, p. 628). The explicit
adoption of a normative theory as an epistemic goal by a rea-
soner would seem to be an exceptionally rare circumstance. It is
far more likely that someone consciously sets out to reason or
argue ‘rationally’ or ‘correctly,’ but that their knowledge or appli-
cation of a particular set of normative standards is merely implicit
to this goal. Indeed, untrained participants often demonstrate
deductive competence when their responses are judged accord-
ing to logical principles, but this does not mean that their goal
was to respond in accordance with a normative system such as
logic, nor does it mean that explicit knowledge of logical prin-
ciples was applied in the production of normatively consistent
responses.
Given Elqayam’s (2012) apparent proposal that explicit aware-
ness of a normative benchmark is necessary for a reasoning process
to be designated as normative – either from a grounded rational-
ity perspective (Elqayam, 2012) or from a Rationality2 perspective
(Evans and Over, 1996) – then the attainment of such norma-
tivity by a reasoner would only be available to elite participants
who have been trained in, for example, formal logic or Bayesian
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probability. The untutored will be unlikely to recognize explicitly
their analytic thinking as conforming to these criteria and so
cannot be described as conforming to Rational2 standards. In
fact, we would only really be able to claim that someone has
been Rational2 if we asked them after an experiment to tell us
which normative standard they were following and they were
able to describe this normative standard successfully. There-
fore, untutored participants who, during an experiment, set
their instrumental goal to follow the instructions, to consider
carefully every state of affairs that they can bring to mind and
to respond rationally, cannot be considered Rational2 accord-
ing to Elqayam’s proposal. Instead, they would be classiﬁed as
having produced normative responses via Rational1 processes.
The result is, we contend, an incredibly narrow conception of
Rationality2, whereby it virtually never occurs in standard rea-
soning research, where participants are almost always selected
because they are naïve to formal logic or some other normative
benchmark.
Evans (2007) makes it clear that analytic Type2 thinking is not
synonymous with Rational2 thinking. This is not simply because
analytic thinking does not always align with normative respond-
ing, but because Type2 thinking does not necessarily (or even
often) include the conscious goal to reason in accordance with a
speciﬁc set of normative benchmarks. Moreover, we argue that
it should not be claimed that someone is Irrational2 due to their
ignorance of normative benchmarks. If someone is responding
in the absence of a normative benchmark, rather than contra-
vening a standard that they are aware of, they may be better
conceived of as Arational2; only someone who is aware of the
appropriate normative theory, but who then fails in their applica-
tion of it, can be considered to be Irrational2. Participants who
avoid the fundamental analytic bias, but are not trained in a
particular normative theory are, we argue, very valuable to the
development of reasoning theory and are central to the Meliorist
agenda. They do not, however, ﬁt neatly into either category of
rationality.
While claims that thinking reﬂects some normative system or
that thinking ought to conform to a normative system remain con-
troversial, we argue that thinking can be usefully contrasted with
relevant normative systems and that such comparisons inspire and
advance the study of the psychology of reasoning. These compar-
isons should be made with an assumption of bounded rationality
(Simon, 1982), that is, with due consideration to the computa-
tional demands of tasks and the pragmatic interpretations that
people adopt, as well as a realistic stance on the cognitive capac-
ities that we possess. As Stich (1990) famously argued “it seems
simply perverse to judge that subjects are doing a bad job of
reasoning because they are not using a strategy that requires a
brain the size of a blimp” (p. 27). Evans and Elqayam (2011)
acknowledge that “paradigms inspired by normativism have led
to a number of important psychological ﬁndings” (p. 283), and
we concur that while these normative theories do not provide per-
fect foundations for psychological theories of reasoning to be built
upon, they do remain a useful benchmark against which to con-
sider participants’ reasoning. Furthermore, scrutiny of Meliorist
theories from a descriptivist perspective as well as scrutiny of
descriptivist theories from aMeliorist perspective has the potential
to offer insights for enhancing reasoning and for furthering our
ability to describe and understand the cognitive processes that
reasoning is underpinned by. In sum, we accept that there are
numerous issues with taking an uncritical approach to the use
of normative standards in reasoning research, but we also argue
that if such standards are discarded altogether we lose the prover-
bial baby with the bathwater, which undermines our explanations
and descriptions of reasoning processes to the point of potential
triviality.
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GLOSSARY
ARATIONAL
Neither rational nor irrational, but instead existing outside of the
category of rationality.
BELIEF BIAS
The tendency to judge the validity of an argument based on
the believability of its conclusion rather than on whether the
conclusion is logically necessitated by the argument’s premises.
DESCRIPTIVISM
The view that normative standards are not appropriate bench-
marks in cognitive science and that the goal of psycholog-
ical research is to describe behavior without making value
judgments.
DOUBLE NEGATION ELIMINATION
The inference that if not not-A is true then A is true (and its
converse), which is proposed by Rips (1994) as a simple, intuitive
logical rule.
MELIORISM
In general usage, Meliorism is the belief that humans can improve
the world. In the present context the term is used speciﬁcally to
refer to the idea that thinking, reasoning and judgment can be
enhanced through education, training and practice. Meliorism
in this latter sense also reﬂects a research program in Cognitive
Science.
NORMATIVE
Refers to the ‘correct’ answer or the ‘right’ way of doing things.
In the present context, normative benchmarks are the (often
debatable) standards for thinking, reasoning or deciding that par-
ticipant responses tend to be evaluated against. These normative
benchmarks derive from formal, logical systems or probability
theory.
PANGLOSSIAN
Derived from Dr. Pangloss, the eternal optimist in Voltaire’s Can-
dide, Panglossian refers to the belief that ‘all is for the best in the
best of all possible worlds.’ In the present context, it is the idea that
we have the best of all possible cognitive systems.
RATIONALITY1
Thinking, speaking, reasoning, making a decision, or acting in a
way that is generally reliable and efﬁcient for achieving one’s goals.
RATIONALITY2
Thinking, speaking, reasoning, making a decision, or acting when
one has a reason for what one does sanctioned by a normative
theory.
SLIPPERY SLOPE FALLACY
The argument that a relatively small ﬁrst step leads inevitably to the
bottom of the slippery slope, so if A happens then B will happen
and if B happens then C will happen, all the way down to the
terrible scenario of Z.
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